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The Regional Dimensions of the European Integration Under the Expected 




1. Introduction   
 
In this paper it will be made an attempt for a comparative political and economic 
evaluation of the European Integration with the criterion of regional inequalities of the 
European Union. 
  The problem of the European Integration will be analyzed on the basis of national 
and regional inequalities of the European Union. 
  Initially we will examine the regional dimension of the European unification on 
the basis of the European Union with 15 member-states (EU15).  As criteria we select the 
different levels of economic development of the member-states examining the regional 
inequalities at national level.  On this basis we observe that the member states converge 
creating the “hard core of Europe” and the member states diverge from the average level 
of the development of the European Union so that determining the countries of 
“community cohesion”.  Next we apply the previous criteria to the EU27, in other words 
it is useful to research the inequalities of the levels of economic development, which 
result in the European Union, if all the others candidate countries would be able to be 
taken within the EU of 15 as is today. In the EU of 27 with the basis of per capita GNP 
exist three groups of countries instead of two as exist today.   
  The first group consists of the present member-states of the EU15, except Spain, 
Greece and Portugal of which the GNP per capita exceeds by 20% the new weighted 
average of the EU27. 
The second group consists of the present member states of community cohesion, 
i.e. Spain Greece and Portugal plus Cyprus, Czechia,  and Malta with per capita GNP 
between 68% (Czechia ) and 95% (Spain) of the average of the EU27.  
  The third group consists of the remaining eight (8) candidate countries with GNP 
per capita  below of the 40% of the average of the EU27, with the exemption of Slovakia 
and Hungary of which the GNP per capita lies between 56%-58% of the average of the 
EU27. 
  Therefore, the expected expansion with the complex inequalities, will result a big 
challenge for the European regional policy, and the policy of the economic and social 
cohesion. 
  Firstly, the expansion will make more than double the population of the European 
Union that lives in regions with GNP per capita below of the 75% of the present average 
of the EU.  This number will raise from 71 million at the present to 174 million of people 
or differently stated from 19% of the total of EU15 to 36% of the total of EU27.   
  Secondly, the scale and the size of regional inequalities will be increased.  
Therefore, in the 1998 for the less developed regions of the EU15 the GNP per capita was 
the average 65% of the average of the EU15.  With the expansion, the GNP per capita of 
the less developed regions of the candidate countries was on the 37% of the average of 
EU15.     3
Therefore, the co-existence of the poor and rich regions within the EU27 will 
make the regional inequalities more complex in this part of the Union which consists of 
poor countries.  We may possibly  find ourselves in a new allocation of poverty.   
  Finally, we will attempt to achieve the necessary interventions between the EU15 
and the EU27, researching the modern problems of the EU under the expected expansion 
of the European Union. 
 
 
2. The inequalities between the regions of the European Union. «Central» 
and «Regional» States. 
  
The regional income inequalities of the GNP per capita, between the member 
states of the European Union, but mostly between the regions, are still intense
1. The 
average income per head of the 10% of the population, which lives in the most wealthy 
regions, is 2,6 times bigger than the one of the 10% of the population living in the most 
needy regions. The greatest geographic inequality in the European Union is the one 
between the less developed regions and the rest of them. 
In the region of London the GNP per capita arises to 243% of the average 
communal GNP, in contradiction with the 42% of Greek  Ipeiros, which means that we 
have a difference of 5,8 times between the two remoted regions. This is a fact which is 
not observed in the federal states. In the USA the income differences barely surpass the 
double. This unfavourable situation, will worsen even more with the imminent 
enlargement of the European Union, towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, the economic activity of the European Union is concentrated in a core, 
which extends to the triangle between North Yorkshire in Great Britain, France – Compte 
in France and Hamburg in Germany. It is about a region which barely corresponds to the 
1/7 of the territory of the European Union, where the 1/3 of its population lives. 
However, in this region the half of the Community income (47%) is produced
2. As a 
result, the productivity in the wealthy European «banana» is 2,4 times greater than in the 
remoted regions. While, in other comparable economic status, as for example in the USA, 
a much better territorial distribution of the economic activities exists. As a result, the EU 
lacks in a polycentric model of economic activities, which undoubtedly represents a 
positive factor for the territorial cohesion of the USA, where the territorial imbalance, as 
income is concerned is obviously smaller. 
The inequalities with regard to unemployment still remain quite large in the 
Union. In 1999, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and Finland had unemployment percentages 
of up to 10%, which means twice the percentage of Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Portugal, where the corresponding percentage was below 5%
3. The regional 
inequalities become more intense. The 10% of the population in the problematic regions 
in 1999 suffered from 23% of unemployment, which is almost 8 times a bigger 
unemployment index than the less stricken regions which have 3% of unemployment. 
Additionally in 1996, the income of 18% of the population of the Union, which means 1 
in 6 residents, was below the poverty level, which upon  Eurostat, is this part of the 
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population with income equal or smaller than 60% of the average income of its country. 
In an attempt to lessen this negative situation, the European Commission constituted, 
between 1999  – 2000, objective criteria’s for the designation of the selectability for 
regional reinforcement. Therefore,, the percentage of the population of the European 
Union which is entitled t o economic support was decreased from 46,7% to 42,7% 
whereas the assistance now focuses more on the most problematic regions. 
Nevertheless, the inequalities have been decreased. Especially in the countries of 
the Communal Cohesion (Greece, Spain, Portugal and till recently Ireland) the average 
income per head has been increased from 68% of the average of  the European Union in 
1988, to 79% in 1999. Which means that we have a reduction of the initial gap by 1/3. 
The attenuation of the regional inequalities between the regions is smaller, partly, due to 
the span of the gap between the regions into specific member states. On the other hand, 
an important improvement in the infrastructures of the poor regions is observed, which is 
extremely important for their long – term development perspectives. 
 
 Table 1   The more and less prospering regions of the Union, GNP per capita as a 
percentage of the Union’s average. 
Regions  ÅÅ15  ÅÅ27 
  1988  1998  1998 
10%+  155,3  160,9  176,9 
10%-  55,1  61,0  31,1 
idex   2,8  2,6  5,7 
25%+  134,1  137,1  152,0 
25%-  66,6  68,3  44,3 
idex   2,0  2,0  3,4 
§  10%+ and 25%+ : the regions with the highest GNP per capita, which correspond to the 10% and 25%  
of the total Union’s popoulation. 
§  10%- and 25%- : the regions with the lowest GNP per capita, which correspond to the 10% and 25%  
of the total Union’s popoulation. 
Source : Eurostat, etimates REGIO 
 
 
The regional inequalities between regions of the European Union are even bigger. 
The 10% of the wealthy regions where the GNP per capita is the highest in the EU are 
constituted mostly by northern capitals and by the most wealthy regions of southern 
Germany and northern Italy. The expansion of the sample in the regions which have GNP 
per capita over the 25% of the Union’s average, results to the inclusion of a lot of regions 
of the United Kingdom, some of Austria, Belgium, Holland, Madrid and Rome (Lazio). 
(Table 1). 
On the very opposite site of the wealthy regions lie the poor regions of the EU. 
The 10% of poor regions comprises mostly of Greek and the Overseas Departments of 
France and includes also some regions of Portugal, Spain and southern Italy. While, if we 
expand our sample in 25% of the poorest regions of the EU then we can also include a lot 
of other Spanish and Portuguese regions, the biggest part of southern Italy and eastern 
Germany, as well as some regions of France and Great Britain. 
The differences between the wealthy (10%+) and the poor (10% -) regions are 
very intense. The wealthy regions which are on the top of the pyramid, have GNP per 
capita 60% over the Union’s average. On the contrary, the poor regions which are at the   5
bottom of the pyramid have an average level of GNP per capita which is 40% lower than 
the Union’s average. 
In other words, the total wealthy regions, where the 10% of the Union’s 
population live, have GNP per capita 2.5 times bigger than the income of the poor 
regions, where another 10% of the Union’s population live. Accordingly, the wealthy 
regions which stand over the 25% of the scale dispose a double level of income 
comparing to this of the poor regions which lie under the 25%. Additionally, the 1/3 of 
the total GNP of the EU corresponds to the wealthy regions, opposite the 1/6 which 
corresponds to the poor regions
4. 
Nevertheless, there has been an important convergence during 1988 – 1998. In the 
10% of the poorest regions, the GNP per capita was increased from 55% of the Union 
average to 60%, even if in the 25% of the poorest regions the corresponding alteration 
was only from 66% of the Union average to 68%. This fact underlines the long – term 
nature of the economic convergence, since the gap between the 10% of the poorest 
regions and the Union average was decreased only per 1%  during those 10 years. 
Beyond the regional inequalities, which are detected in the totality of the EU, in 
many cases, huge inequalities exist in the interior of the member states. More specifically 
the divided economy of Italy and Germany comprises of representative examples. 
However, in most countries, a region, or few of them, have levels of GNP per capita 
which exceed by far from the national average. 
For example, the capital cities, like London or Paris (île de France), incline to 
have an income far higher from the average, while in several remoted and rural regions, 
such as Ipeiros in Greece, Calabria in Italy and Azores in Portugal, the GNP per capita is 
enough lower from the average. 
This uneven situation, which prevails inside the member states, demonstrates that 
the states of the Community are not able to be considered to constitute homogeneous 
economies and how important it is to examine the regional particularities by the looming 
national tensions. 
The tendency which was marked out by the First Cohesion Report, that the 
regional inequalities are still in extension, seems to be valid for a respectable number of 
member states, but in some other member states the regional inequalities are lightly 
reduced. 
The recent reduction of regional inequalities, which was observed in definite 
member states it is possible to be just circular, given that the underdeveloped regions 
incline to converge more in period of economic flourish than in period of economic 
crisis. Besides, the actual regional inequalities still remain, especially in some of the less 
prospering member states. 
In Greece, for example, while the GNP per capita does not diverge a lot between 
its 13 regions, however during the recent years an economic gap has been generated 
between Athens and Thessaloniki on one side, and the rest of the country, on the other 
side. Especially after the closure of the terrestrial routes to the rest of the states of the EU 
through the former - united Yogoslavia, the harbour of Pireas and the airport of Athens 
constitute the basic passes for the distribution of commerce with the rest of the world. 
The permanent modulate situation on the north borders of Greece results so that the 
regions of faraway and mountainous inland remain the poorest in the mainland of the EU. 
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In Spain, the second in size country of the Union, the model of economic 
development seems to diversify and the concern of the economic policy in this country 
focuses mostly on the confrontation of intense regional inequalities. So the GNP per 
capita remains relatively high in Madrid and Catalonia, while during 1988 – 1998 the 
GNP per capita index set farther increase in these regions. Likewise, southern regions, 
mostly Navara and the Country of Basques present respectable economic performance. 
On the contrary, the regions which lie at the north – east end of the country, as well as the 
regions of under – developed South, exhibit intense regional inequalities. At south  – 
eastern regions the GNP increases in rythmes below the Union’s average, while in the 
regions of the South which are included in the less developed parts of the EU, the 
increase of GNP is almost nilpotent. Propotianally, the regional inequalities in Spain were 
farther widened. 
Intense regional inequalities are also observed in Portugal, although they were 
notably restricted over the last 10 years. The economic development of this country 
concentrates mostly on the coastal part of Lisabona, Porto and Algavri. 
Italy continues to constitute a characteristic example of the difference between 
South and North. The inequalities here are not only intense but lasting too. Despite the 
fact that the southern regions achieved a respectable economic development, the GNP per 
capita in Mejojorno still remains round 60 – 70% of the Union’s average. 
The new Germanic Federal States noted an important progress in the GNP per 
capita, where the development rate was particularly rapid during the first years of the 
unification. Nevertheless, the GNP per capita in 1998 in the regions of Germany amounts 
to the 68 – 70% of the Union’s average. 
Provided, the tensions of the past continue, several decades will be necessary for 
the elimination of the regional inequalities in the recent EU. More specifically, though it 
is possible for the regional economies to converge annals on their balance level of GNP, 
there is, however, no necessary reason for which this process must lead to convergence 
with the level of the European Union’s GNP per capita. 
With the enlargement of the EU the economic scene will alter totally. Based on 
the analysis of the subordinated situation it occurs that the income differences between 
the states and the regions will double; which means that in a Union of 27 member – states 
we will have as a result in national level that up to 1/3 of the population will live in 
countries with income per head  lower than 90% of the Union’s average, in comparison 
with the 1/6 in the today’s Union of 15. 
In national level, in the Union of 27, the states will be separated into three big 
categories. The group of the wealthiest member states which will have an income beyond 
the average and where the 12 member states of today’s Union will be included, all except 
from Greece, Spain, Portugal. An intermediate group will follow, with Greece, Spain, 
Porugal, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Czechia; their income will arise at 80% 
approximately, of the average and we will have a population of 13% of the total 
population of EU27. 
The real change in comparison with the today’s Union is created from the 
existence of a third big group, in which the remaining candidate countries will be 
included, and where the income per head will arise only to 40% of the Union’s of 27 
average. It concerns a big group, with population which corresponds to 16% of the total 
population of EU27. That means that the enlargement will notably increase the income   7
inequalities. This inbalance and the need for their confrontation acquires an additional 
dimension with the enlargement, since the territory of the Union will be doubled, in 
regard with the beginning of the decade of 90’s with the accession of new countries. 
 
3. The accession of new member – states (EU27) and the doubling of the 
regional inequalities.    
 
It would be extremely useful to examine the inequalities at the levels of economic 
development, which will occur to the Community, if all the candidate countries could be 
count with the member – states of EU15. 
In the EU of 27 member – states, three groups of countries distinguish by GNP 
per capita, instead of two which stood out till nowadays
5. 
The first group of the today’s member – states of EU15, except from Spain, 
Greece and Portugal, of which the GNP per capita exceeds by 20% the new calculated 
average of EU27. 
The actual states of the communal cohesion constitute the second group, which 
means Spain, Greece and Portugal plus Cyprus, Czechia and Malta, with GNP per capita 
between 68% (Czechia) and 95% (Spain) of the EU’s 27 average. 
The remaining 8 candidate countries constitute the third group with GNP per 
capita below the 40% of the average of the EU27, with the only exception of Slovakia 
and Hungary of which the GNP per capita lies between 56 – 58% of the EU27 average. 
Consequently, the imminent enlargement with the complex regional inequalities, 
will comprise a big challenge for the European Regional Policy and the policy of 
economic and social cohesion. 
Firstly, the enlargement will redouble the population of the EU which lives in 
regions with GNP below the 75% of recent EU average. This number will arise from 71 
millions today to 174 millions inhabitants, or else from 19% of the total of the EU15 to 
36% of total EU27. 
Secondly, it will increase the intensity, or else, the scale and the size of regional 
inequalities. So, in 1998 for the less developed regions of the EU15 the GNP per capita 
was by average to 65% of EU15 average. With the enlargement the GNP per capita of the 
less developed regions of the  candidate countries was almost at the 37% of EU15 
average. 
The interweave of wealthy and poor regions in the EU27 will complicate even 
more the regional inequalities in that part of the Union which is comprised by the poor 
countries. Possibly, we are faced with an oxymoron schema of repartition of poverty. 
The integration of the 12 candidate countries will have no substantial result as the 
economic identity of wealthy countries and regions with the highest GNP per capita is 
concerned. On the other hand, it will alter radically the structure and the comparative 
income level of the countries and the regions with the lowest GNP per capita. 
Having as a criterion the population, the poorest 10% of the regions, in the 
extended EU27 will be constituted almost wholly by the regions of eastern Poland, 
Bulgaria and Rumania and also Lithouania and Latvia. The 25% of the regions with the 
lowest GNP per capita will include almost all the regions of the candidate countries and 
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most of the regions of Greece; also Azores, Madeira in Portugal and Andalucia, 
Extremadura in Spain. 
It is equally remarkable, how significantly the GNP per capita for the poorest 
regions of (10%-) has been decreased. From 61% of European average in the EU15, it 
reduces to 31% of the extended EU27 average. While, only Ipeiros has a lower income 
from the half of EU average up to now. In the extended EU27, almost 79 million people 
will inhabit regions with GNP per capita lower than the one of Ipeiros. 
In an extended EU27, the inequalities between member – states, based on the 
GNP per capita will show dramatic crisis. More specifically the proportion between rich 
and poor countries in the EU27, will be almost the double than the one of the EU15. In 
regional scale the wealthy regions (25%+), in an extended EU27, will have a GNP per 
capita average which will be 3,3 times bigger than this of the poor regions (25%-), in 
contrast with the actual analogy in EU15, which is 1,9 times bigger. Finally, the 
wealthiest regions (10%+), will have 5,3 times greater GNP per capita after the 
enlargement, than the actual proportion which is 2,4 times bigger. 
The enlargement of the EU with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will 
alter notably the actual picture of the Union, by redoubling its territory comparing to this 
in the early 90’s, by enforcing the validity of the model center – region which will be 
reinforced by the accession of the new member – states. This fact raises new challenges 
for the territorial cohesion, given the continual importance of the restraint of the regional 
inequalities. 
Recent research for the consequences of the integration to the regional balance of 
the EU, has noted the need for accompanying policies, so as a potential increase of the 
inequalities between the forceful and the weak regions to be avoided
6. 
This conclusion is based on the acceptance that the economic area is characterized 
by significant economic scales, which may be positive or negative, and it does not seem 
that the market power, on its own, is in position to counterbalance the positive and the 
negative consequences, so as to conclude to a balanced economic growth in the total of 
EU. Thus, while the concentration of the economic activities at the more powerful 
regions it is possible medium – termly to lead to greater efficiency of the productivity in 
the EU, this will turn against the long – term competitiveness of the EU’s economy, at the 
point where it hurts the workforce of the poorest regions and constrains their ability to 
utilize their comparative advantages. 
Consequently, the economic activity in the EU still remains in a big point 
concentrated in a relatively small central area; as a result the congestion cost increases 
vertically, the salaries become higher, economic imbalance and an intense contrast 
between center and region exists. 
In the EU27 three categories of regions can be distinguished: 
Under – developed regions, with high agricultural employment, with a portion of 
participation in the industrial occupation above the average and low occupation at 
services. These regions lie mostly at southern member – states and at the countries of 
Central Europe, except from Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. Besides, while the 
agricultural occupation in the EU lies below the 5% of its total, in some regions in Spain 
and Portugal, it is above 20%. 
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Regions with high occupation in industry. Several of these regions concentrated 
on a central arrow, which extends from West Midlands in England, the eastern France 
and northern Spain, through southern Germany and northern Italy to the Czechic 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. Though, several of these regions are wealthy, many 
others are not, reflecting the big fluctuation in the added value from the several 
manufacturing industries. 
Regions with high occupation at services. It is about regions of which the 
population portion in the tertiary sector of the economy arises at 70% or even more. The 
most of these regions are wealthy and they include a lot of capitals of North Europe. In 
this category regions from southern France, Spain and Italy are included, regions which 
have relatively low GNP per capita levels, but the occupation is concentrated in basic 
services, several of which supply the tourist development
7. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In our research the European integration is defined by using as criterion the force. 
The stronger in economics and politics a member – states is, the more important its 
position will be. What kind of equality is it possible to exist, between Greece and 
Germany when the second country possesses over the 30% of the percentaging synthesis 
of euro, and Greece partipates only by 0,5% Germany, the leading economic power of the 
EU, is high economically developed, a fact which is exhibited in its big commercial 
surplus balance; by having crashed the European economies, Germany enters the 
international scene by questing its leadership. This country is very parsimonious to the 
increase of the Community Budget. It seems to prefer its own growth than Europe’s. It 
allegrates with the other countries of the industrial North, that it spends huge amounts for 
the support of the Community’s structural policy. Our research came up with the 
conclusion that these countries frustrate whatever corresponds to them and afterwards 
they receive it, mostly through the market, in multiple. 
The European  construction under Germanic domination, has as a consequence 
that the «small regional» member – states of the Union lose their national substance 
gradually. In contrast with «central royal» member – states which are enforced. The 
economic slippage of the w eaker «regional» member – states of the Union seems to 
constitute the result of unequal development. Besides, in the frame of the EU, there is no 
communal interest, but only separate national interests. In this sense, some nations are 
developed and some other are set aside. 
The unequal European integration seems to be reinforced also through the 
decentralizing policy of the Communities Supports Frameworks. These programmes are 
of a limited character and are still far beyond the postwar Marshall plan. Only the market 
guides to the unequal European integration and under no circumstances the penniless 
Communities Supports Frameworks. 
Especially in our days, a period of an unrestricted neo – liberalism, what comes 
first for the powerful communal members and the  multinational enterprises, is the 
secureness of the terms as well of the presuppositions for the creation of a Single Market 
in Europe, where they will be able to sell their products freely. Moreover, the absence of 
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a severe financial policy from the part of the EEC, since its constitution, despite the 
separately reformations and changes still characterizes it uninterruptedly. 
And the question is: How is the communal regional policy going to confront the 
income differences, which are still a fundamental element of the unequal European 
Integration, with the limited economic resources which disposes, as an emanation of its 
small communal budget? Besides, the financial policy of the EU can be better 
apprehended if we compare it with the corresponding policies of the federal states, as for 
example, of the USA, Canada and Australia, where the expenses of the confederation 
cover at least 50% of the total national costs. At the same time, Community Budget arises 
barely to the 2% of the total public costs in the EU. 
The inequality and the asymmetrical development between the member – states of 
the EU will increase as we will proceed towards its enlargement. Besides, it is sure, that 
the intercommunal differences and the competition, mostly between the leading states, 
will be maximized in order to take total control of the Union. 
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